Kashmir: Answering Bullets with Stones by Usman Khalid

It is being realized that in an ‘asymmetrical war’ the troops are largely a liability

 

More than fifteen civilians, mostly youngsters, have been killed in police firing in past three weeks of civil unrest in Kashmir and yet the government is still of the view that like erstwhile princes they could continue to rule as long as they have a blank cheque from New Delhi.

They have had that blank cheque for decades in the form of anti-terrorism laws and 750,000 security personnel. That had been enough to deal with about 90,000 troops deployed by Pakistan against the Indian Army in Jammu and Kashmir and never more than a few hundred resistance fighters (Mujahideen). That is changing. It is being realized that in an ‘asymmetrical war’ the troops are largely a liability. They provide targets to Mujahideen in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in the West Bank and in Jammu and Kashmir. That is why Israel withdrew from South Lebanon only sixty days after it invaded even though it was faced by only Hezbollah irregulars – not armed forces of any country or of any description. The Iraqis were the first to find that regular troops were much easier to kill and defeat. The Afghans evolved the tactics for this new kind of war in their fight against the Soviet Union. They are using the same tactics now against the Americans and NATO in Afghanistan.

However, there is much dispute over what is the secret of the success in this new type of war. Credit is given to ‘murderous discipline’ of the Takfiri cadres who constitute the bulk of the resistance. But if that was the case, the murderous discipline of the LTTE in Sri Lanka or many other terrorist groups would have stolen victories. The discipline of RAW and Mossad is no less murderous; CIA and the FBI are no patsies. Why are they so helpless in Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine? The secret is that the resistance is defending their land and their people. It takes them while to learn but they always learn that resistance cannot succeed unless it deals with collaborators first. That was the secret of its success in Viet Nam, and Algeria and now in Palestine and Iraq. In Afghanistan, the collaborators (erstwhile supporters of Hamid Karzai) have since surrendered and saved their lives and future. Would that be enough for the triumph of the resistance? If the resistance listened to good advice given to them by Pakistan, they could strike a deal with Americans and bring normalcy to this country ravaged by war for three decades.

The resistance in Jammu and Kashmir still is dealing with the collaborators. Unless the collaborators are eliminated; there cannot be freedom. Some collaborators will run away to India and others will hunker in their bunkers in silent payer. No one who can speak in favour of military occupation should walk the streets of Srinagar or any other town in Jammu and Kashmir.

Then the military (not the police) would become the target like it did in Iraq and Afghanistan. The military should be afraid of walking the streets just as the Kashmiri collaborators. In the end, asymmetrical wars come to a conclusion because the cost of occupation is unbearable. The threshold of the USA is low – it fields troops used to a life of luxury in an environment of peace and order. The threshold of Israel is somewhat higher because it has separation walls everywhere but it still cannot field troops to foreign soil. The threshold of India is even higher because it recruits from among the poorest and most undernourished in the world and pays its soldiers a pittance in salary.

The Indian threshold has not been tested until now. It needs to answer to many questions. Is a nuclear war with Pakistan price worth paying to maintain occupation of Jammu and Kashmir? Is deployment of 750,000 troops a price worth paying to deny freedom to 14 million Kashmiris? The billion plus figure of India’s population would not be dented by J&K joining Pakistan; the percentage of Muslims in India may shrink from 15% to 14%. Would that be such a catastrophe for which India should put its future in jeopardy?

Would there be ‘damage’ to the ‘greatness of India’ if it honoured its promise to allow the Kashmiris to decide their future in a plebiscite? Price being paid by India is already too high. What is preventing India to cut its losses and get out? It is the proverbial obstinacy of the Brahmin– Raj Hat – that comes in the way. How can it allow the will of non-Brahmin will to prevail? Regrettably, asymmetrical war in Kashmir is likely to continue!

The writer – Usman Khalid - is the Secretary General of Rifah Party of Pakistan